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Other holes are more endemic of the state of the literature in general (specifical-
ly, pipe and cigar smoking, the most popular forms of smoking in the nineteenth
century). The book is strongest in the earlier sections on Native and early European
consumption of tobacco where Goodman draws from a broad range of literature and
creatively gives important context (for example, the comparison of tobacco to coca
in the indigenization process). The well-developed research on the agricultural and
commercial history of tobacco is also nicely synthesized. It is only in the more
modern period that the suspicious thematic format of the book becomes a narrative
device that obscures lack of research. It would have been more useful to point out
the problem of gaps in the research by emphasizing the different periods of tobacco
use. At any rate, Tobacco in History is a useful guide to the vast amount of re-
search on tobacco and will be helpful to future researchers on the subject.
Jarrett Rudy
McGill University
William A. Tidwell  April ’65: Confederate Covert Action in the American Civil
War. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1995. Pp. vii, 264.
In our conspiracy-minded age, historians increasingly feel compelled to evaluate
presidential assassination theories. We live in a time, after all, when Oliver Stones
JFK packs movie theatres and when supposedly rational scientists exhume the body
of innocuous Zachary Taylor to investigate rumours of foul play. In this atmo-
sphere, it was perhaps inevitable that we would revisit one of the oldest of these
plots: the alleged conspiracy to kill Abraham Lincoln.
Speculation about a cabal going beyond John Wilkes Booth and his cohorts
surfaced soon after Lincolns assassination in 1865. In the years since, various
accusers have fixed culpability on U.S. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, Vice-
President Andrew Johnson, and Radical Republicans in Congress. In his second
book on the assassination, William Tidwell offers yet another perspective. He
argues that the plan which ultimately resulted in Lincolns murder originated in the
highest levels of the Confederate government.
Drawing on his previous work in Come Retribution: The Confederate Secret
Service and the Assassination of Lincoln (1988), Tidwell explores the entire range
of Confederate covert operations. He exposes an intricate network of military men,
diplomats, and private individuals who tried to win through stealth what the Confed-
eracy had lost on the battlefield. In the process, Tidwell analyzes the role of covert
warfare in the nineteenth century, the escalating brutality of the Civil War, and the
creation of a Southern usable past.
Tidwell holds that Jefferson Davis and his Secretary of State, Judah Benjamin,
decided in late 1864 to kidnap Lincoln and recapture the initiative in the Civil War.
To plan this effort the Confederacy relied on a large intelligence organization,
which included John Wilkes Booth. As matters grew more desperate for the Con-
federacy in early 1865, the kidnapping plan evolved into a plot to blow up the
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White House in a last-ditch assassination mission authorized by Jefferson Davis.
When the mission failed, John Wilkes Booth, acting without orders but believing
himself to be carrying out Richmonds wishes, launched his own assassination
conspiracy, with regrettable success.
Tidwell supports his thesis through newly discovered evidence documenting an
extensive Confederate secret service organization with a long tradition of behind-
the-lines action. These recently unearthed Confederate Treasury records list $1.5
million in expenditures approved by Davis for unspecified covert operations. Many
of these funds went to support a sophisticated Rebel intelligence apparatus in
Canada designed to support the Norths Copperhead peace movement and to
launch raids like the failed assault on St. Albans, Vermont, in 1864.
Military historians have often touted the Civil War as a time of innovation in
technology and tactics  the first modern war. But Tidwell argues that the conflict
also launched a revolution in intelligence. The Confederacy, he asserts, came
to an understanding of clandestine operations that is unique in the history of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (p. 83). Confederates pioneered use of underwa-
ter explosives, established an elite training school for irregular warfare, and devel-
oped an innovative strategy for utilizing private resources and individuals to support
government aims. Most significantly, the Confederate government overcame Victor-
ian cultural strictures mandating honourable warfare and embraced ruthless
covert tactics including sabotage and use of land mines against the enemys rear
echelon. By 1863 the Confederate government was financing full-fledged terrorism
against the North. They even tried to burn down New York City in November 1864.
The brutal logic of total war soon impelled the Confederates to consider even
assassination as a legitimate tool of combat.
After 1865 these events were obscured in the postwar haze of reunion. In the
mood of sectional reconciliation which predominated during the Gilded Age, the
troubling facts of the Lincoln plot had no place. Tidwell describes how an evolving
Southern mythology characterized its war effort as an honourable one conducted by
chivalrous men in open battle. In this myth, Lincoln was revered as the Souths
best friend (p. 3), who sought to prevent a harsh Reconstruction and whose death
represented a tragedy, not a victory, for the former Confederacy. The Lost Cause
myth served to dissociate a noble Confederacy from the Lincoln assassination, a
process expedited by several ex-Confederate intelligence officers. After the incident
at Fords theatre, Confederate agents in Canada began a concerted campaign to
absolve the Davis government of responsibility for the murder. These operatives
leaked disinformation to federal investigators and prevented the truth about Rich-
monds involvement from emerging. This campaign was the Confederate secret
services most significant accomplishment.
Tidwell avoids the hysterical implausibility of many conspiracy theorists and
methodically attempts to reconstruct a logical premise based on new evidence and
rational calculation of the Confederacys wartime options. His conclusions will
probably outrage those who still cling to the legend of a gentlemanly Civil War, but
his research concurs with much of current historiography. The books tantalizing
explorations into the social history of the war years are too brief, but pose some
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interesting questions regarding public opinion toward warfare and the construction
of the Lost Cause mythology.
April ’65 also suffers from some serious flaws, however. Given the events he
describes, one must question the authors assertion that the Confederacy launched
a revolution in intelligence. Aside from the assassination itself, which was almost
an accident, none of the covert operations Tidwell describes amounted to much. The
effort to transform the Copperhead movement into a Confederate fifth column never
came close to success. Ambitious Southern plans to free thousands of Confederate
prisoners of war held in the North never proceeded far beyond the planning stage.
Confederate saboteurs annoyed Union forces, but much less so than conventional
military units such as Nathan Bedford Forrests cavalry. Given these facts, it is
difficult to share the authors claims of Confederate success.
Tidwells effort to tie Lost Cause mythology into his work is admirable; indeed,
it is the most interesting part of the book. But the authors rather broad brush
strokes simplify a complex social phenomenon. The reader almost gets the impres-
sion that the entire effort to glorify the Southern cause, from the apotheosis of
Robert E. Lee to D. W. Griffiths hagiographic The Birth of a Nation, was merely
part of a counter-intelligence effort to conceal the truth behind Lincolns assassina-
tion. Tidwell ignores the racial element which lay at the heart of the Lost Cause and
its relevance to the politics of Reconstruction. Admittedly, this is not the authors
focus, but any analysis of Confederate mythology demands more detail.
Tidwell has an unfortunate tendency to quote secondary research to support key
arguments. As a result, the reader is left wondering about the documentation of
important evidence. Even when the author does use important primary sources, he
sometimes extrapolates elaborate assumptions from limited information. The secret
service financial records, for example, are a remarkable new find, but they do not
provide enough proof for this historian. They do not list names of Booth or any of
the other known conspirators, nor do they specify any planned attacks on the White
House or Lincoln. Tidwell assumes that some of these monies funded Booths
surveillance and the attempted demolition of the White House  the author calls
this his smoking gun (p. 164)  but he offers little supporting evidence.
Indeed, April ’65 is filled with speculative conclusions. Tidwell admits at the
outset that much of his evidence is circumstantial (p. 7), but this does not
prevent him from making some startling statements. For example: Confederate spy
Rose ONeil Greenhow likely [had] an unnamed somebody keeping track of ...
cipher systems (p. 61); the Union vessel Sultana, sunk in 1865, could have
contained a [Confederate] torpedo; many Confederate agents would have been
perfectly happy to see Lincoln dead and may well have said so in Booths pres-
ence (p. 196). Such statements do little to support the credibility of Tidwells
claims and in the end leave the reader with nothing to bite into. At base, much of
Tidwells argument is sheer conjecture. Until more evidence is uncovered, it will
remain so.
Jonathan Sarris
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